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Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment

Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2021

We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity – i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191476

Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment

Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars H. - In: Journal of economic theory 209 (2023), pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014371687

Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment

Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012667955

Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment

Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2022

We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity - i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197547

Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment

Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2022

We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity - i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013483496

On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment

Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2023

We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex ante. However, we show that there is no mechanism that is likewise (i)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014279888

Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation

Shende, Priyanka; Purohit, Manish - In: Journal of economic theory 213 (2023), pp. 1-38

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014472203

Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences

Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Wakayama, Takuma - 2015

We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. We provide a new concept of fairness, called position-wise envy-freeness, that is compatible with individual rationality. This new concept requires...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317289

Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment : three impossibility results

Nesterov, Alexander - 2014

This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010438227

Zur Manipulierbarkeit der Allokation öffentlicher Güter : theoretische Analyse und Simulationsergebnisse

Lindner, Tobias - 2011

Vorschlägen eine Budgetaufteilung (Allokation) bestimmt wird. Von besonderem Interesse ist die Frage, welche Abstimmungsregeln … nicht manipulierbar sind, das heißt für keinen Agenten einen Anreiz bieten, eine Allokation vorzuschlagen, die nicht mit … diese Verfahren als auch andere Abstimmungsregeln zur Allokation öffentlicher Güter sind, wenn man die weitaus größere …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012654078

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