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Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness?

Aaken, Anne van; Voigt, Stefan - In: Economics of governance 12 (2011) 4, pp. 301-324

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009377914

Do Individual Disclosure Rules for Parliamentarians Improve Government Effectiveness?

van Aaken, Anne - 2014

corruption, increased citizen trust in parliament, and better quality of law-making. Others argue that disclosure rules endanger … composition of parliament empirically. We find that the introduction of disclosure rules is usually not accompanied by a … significant shift in the proportion of lawyers and businesspeople in parliament (direct effect). In general, we did not find …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071165

Apportionment behind the veil of uncertainty

Wada, Junichiro - In: The Japanese economic review : the journal of the … 67 (2016) 3, pp. 348-360

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011720873

Selection of public servants into politics : an economic analysis of its causes and consequences

Brändle, Thomas - 2013 - 1. Aufl.

Abstract: Die Selektion öffentlicher Bediensteter in die Politik ist ein weitverbreitetes, jedoch kaum verstandenes Phänomen. Einerseits generiert die starke Vertretung öffentlicher Bediensteter in der Politik Interessenkonflikte und weckt Bedenken bezüglich des Gewaltenteilungsprinzips....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012015156

Endogenous institutions : the case of U.S. Congressional redistricting

Jeong, Dahyeon; Shenoy, Ajay - 2017

We measure where and to what end parties take control of Congressional redistricting, which lets them redraw districts to favor their own candidates. We exploit the discontinuous change in a party's control of redistricting triggered when its share of seats in the state legislature exceeds 50...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771673