I propose that the utility function of an economic agent will be concave for wealth below the current wealth and will be convex for wealth above the current wealth. This utility function allows the agent to display simultaneous risk averse and risk seeking behaviour. The cubic utility function...

This model explains dividends as a component of a screening contract set up by an uninformed principal. I start from a well documented empirical fact that there is a relation between dividends declared and executive compensation. I find that when hidden information is about the productivity of...

Using a theoretical extension of the Friedman and Savage (1948) utility function developed in Bhattacharyya (2003), we predict that for financial assets with negative expected returns, expected return will be a declining and convex function of skewness. Using a sample of U.S. state lottery...

Recent studies have documented an association between managerial compensation and firm dividend policy. Bhattacharyya (2000) develops a model of dividend payout that is based in the principal-agent paradigm. In Bhattacharyya's model, managerial quality and effort are unobservable to shareholders...

While researchers have found that dividend payout ratios are negatively related to executive compensation in North America, a relevant question remains as to whether such relationships hold in other institutional environments. Evidence from this study suggests that, as in North America, there is...

Empirical modeling of dividends has been dominated by Lintner (1956). However, Lintner's model suffers from the logical paradox that if companies have target payout ratios then in the steady state the companies will have reached those target payout ratios. Moreover as demonstrated by Bond and...

Empirical modeling of dividends has been dominated by Lintner (1956). However, Lintner's model suffers from the logical paradox that if companies have target payout ratios then in the steady state the companies will have reached those target payout ratios. Moreover as demon-strated by Bond and...

The accounting and mutual fund scandals of the last few years have led to increased scrutiny over the information provided by financial services to investors. These scandals have cast doubt on the supposedly honest and impartial reporting of facts by the financial industry. This paper looks at...

Traditional finance theories assume that investors are risk averse whereas in reality investors exhibit both risk averse and risk seeking behaviors. For example the same individual could be purchasing insurance (risk averse) and lottery ticket (risk seeking) simultaneously. We propose that the...

This model explains dividends as a component of a contract set up by an uninformed principal. I start from a well-documented empirical fact that there is a relation between dividends declared and executive compensation. I find that when hidden information is about the productivity of the agent...