Consider an investment problem with strategic complementarities and incomplete information about returns. This paper shows that investors aggregate their private information in equilibrium by trading a token and observing its market price over multiple rounds before making the investment...

We consider an economy where trade is decentralized and agents have incomplete information with respect to the value of money. Agents' learning evolves from private experiences and we explore how the formation of prices interacts with learning. We show that multiple equilibria arise, and...

This paper investigates robust information transmission between a sender and a receiver in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. We characterize behavior that remains equilibrium behavior independently of the form of a small communication cost. Under standard conditions, we find that an...

We consider a standard persuasion problem in which the receiver’s action and the state of the world are both one-dimensional. Fully characterizing optimal signals when utilities are non-linear is a daunting task. Instead, we develop a general approach to understanding a key qualitative...

We analyze an agency model where one individual decides how much evidence he collects. We assume that he has free access to information, but all the news acquired become automatically public. Conditional on the information disclosed, a second individual with conflicting preferences undertakes an...