International financial institutions (IFIs) generally enjoy preferred creditors treatment (PCT). Although PCT rarely appears in legal contracts, when sovereigns restructure bilateral or commercial debts they normally pay IFIs in full. This paper presents a model where a creditor, such as an IFI,...

International nancial markets are far from perfect. Because of problems related to contract enforcement borrowers often end up being rationed; the lenders tend to constrain the amount lent ex ante in order to motivate the borrowers to ful l their obligations and not default ex post. In this paper...

This paper examines two major risks to foreign investors: default on sovereign debt and expropriation of foreign direct investment, which we refer to collectively as "sovereign theft." Using a series of formal models, we analyze how the incentives to engage in sovereign theft vary with the state...

This paper uses a risk-management approach to re-profile the sovereign debt of countries facing debt crises. Using scenario analysis we develop a risk measure of the sovereign's debt -- Conditional Debt-at-Risk -- and an optimization model is used to trace risk profiles that tradeoff expected...

In this paper we unpack the possibilities and constraints facing sovereign development funds. Our focus and logic is primarily conceptual and deductive rather than directly empirical and inductive. We consider how and in what ways sovereign wealth can be employed for the purpose of economic...