In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...

The central bank's optimal objective function is analyzed in a small open economy model allowing for incomplete exchange rate pass-through. The results indicate that social welfare can only be marginally improved by including an explicit exchange-rate term in the delegated objective function,...

In this paper we propose a general method for testing the Granger noncausality hypothesis in stationary nonlinear models of unknown functional form. These tests are based on a Taylor expansion of the nonlinear model around a given point in a sample space. We study the performance of our tests by...

This paper studies a class of Markov models which consist of two components. Typically, one of the components is observable and the other is unobservable or 'hidden'. Conditions under which (a form of) geometric ergodicity of the unobservable component is inherited by the joint process formed of...

This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

In this paper we derive conditions for the conditional covariance matrix to be positive definite in a general vector ARCH model. The conditions can be easily extended to the diagonal vector GARCH model. For the general vector GARCH model, analytical expressions for the conditions in terms of the...

Average profits of a price taker are increasing in the variability of the output price (Oi, 1961). We show that, for the same reason, average profits of the price taker are increasing in the variability of the price of inputs. We proceed to establish that the same holds for a firm with a...

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices: salience, inertia, the formation of habits, the use of rules of thumb, or the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing. This...