We present a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices and the manipulation propensity is uncertain. We analyze the tradeoffs involved in conditioning pay on long- versus short-term...

This paper documents the aggregate trends in the foreign listings of companies and analyzes both their distinctive pre-listing characteristics and their post-listing performance relative to other companies. In the 1986-97 interval, many European companies listed abroad, but did so mainly on US...

This paper analyses ownership and control structures of Dutch listed companies. Legislation effective since 1992 mandates all shareholders with holdings of 5 percent or more in Dutch companies to disclose their holdings. Our analysis shows that the average ownership stakes of the largest and the...

In this paper we examine the effects of the amount of trade disclosure in an experimental financial market, in which nine professional traders set quotes and trade continuously. In addition to these market makers, two computerized external customers interact, representing both informed and...

The paper examines the impact of executive compensation on private securities litigation. We find that incentive pay in the form of options increases the probability of securities class action litigation, holding constant a wide range of firm characteristics. We further document that there is...

Trust offices (administratiekantoren) that repackage securities have been a central institution in Dutch finance since the late eighteenth century. Their basic form and functioning have remained largely the same, but over time, the repackaging has come to serve a variety of very different...