This paper models optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to influence the public perception of their company, and thus the short-term stock price. Stock prices take the possibility of manipulation into account but fail to fully back it out, the degree of...

The paper examines the impact of executive compensation on private securities litigation. We find that incentive pay in the form of options increases the probability of securities class action litigation, holding constant a wide range of firm characteristics. We further document that there is...

This paper documents aggregate trends in the foreign listings of companies, and analyzes their distinctive prelisting characteristics and postlisting performance. In 1986-1997, many European companies listed abroad, mainly on U.S. exchanges, while the number of U.S. companies listed in Europe...

We examine, both theoretically and empirically, the determinants and performance impact of three measures of CEO incentives: pay-performance elasticity (PPE), semi-elasticity (PPSE), and sensitivity (PPS). Larger, more R&D intensive, and low-idiosyncratic risk firms have higher PPE and PPSE,...