This paper proposes a dynamic model for the process of industry consolidation by sequences of mergers and acquisitions that create synergy gains to merging firms and may impose positive or negative externalities on the remaining firms in the industry. We allow firms to make acquisition offers...

We study how the procurement process may help a buyer reduce purchasing costs under a dual-sourcing setting. First, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes when the buyer simultaneously or sequentially bilaterally negotiates with the suppliers. We establish coordination results and characterize the...

We model decentralized team formation as a game in which players make offers to potential teams whose members then either accept or reject the offers. The games induce no-delay subgame perfect equilibria with unique outcomes that are individually rational and match soulmates. We provide...

We study the implementation of social choice rules in environments with externalities. We prove the impossibility of implementing efficient and α-individually rational rules in dominant strategies. We prove that the α-core is implementable in Nash equilibrium under mild restrictions and it is...

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for retirement, as it is full of energy...

We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types', and thus distinguish ‘conformists' from...

This paper studies Myerson's neutral bargaining solution for a class of Bayesian bargaining problems in which the solution is unique. For this class of examples, I consider a noncooperative mechanism-selection game. I find that all of the interim incentive efficient mechanisms can be supported...

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions...

In this paper, we present a general model in which mutually dependent negotiations are simultaneously conducted and define a solution concept for the model. We provide a sufficient condition for the solution to exist and show that the solutions approximately coincide with the equilibrium...