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The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870134
In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055226
Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied “whenever possible”. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what “whenever possible” means. Then, we provide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588412
I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I first show that values and costs asymmetries are crucial in determining the level of connectedness of a network. Interestingly, unconnected equilibria are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334833
I examine a search model a la' Burdett and Judd (1983). Consumers are embedded in a consumers network, they may costly search for price quotations and the information gathered are non-excludable along direct links. This allows me to explore the effect of endogenous consumers externalities on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335197
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This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324770
A fundamental question in social sciences is how trust emerges. We provide an answer which relies on the formation of social and economic relationships. We argue that behind trust lies the fact that individuals invest in connections taking into account the potential externalities networks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325280