I study how limited information and ex-post evaluation by third parties affect how regulators design approval rules for innovations. I consider a model in which the regulator designs approval rules to minimize criticism for approval errors and for imposing a costly approval process on innovating...

We investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors. Regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator's commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated...

We study the effect of observability on the noncontractible investment of a regulated firm with private marginal cost information. We show that the observability reduces investment, pointing to the regulated firm's prevention of ratcheting. This result, which is in line with an earlier finding...

We investigate the effect of ambiguity about hedge fund investment strategies on asset prices and aggregate welfare. We model some traders (mutual funds) as facing ambiguity about the equilibrium trading strategies of other traders (hedge funds). This ambiguity limits the ability of mutual funds...

As an instrument for managing/optimizing firm/industry wide risks, risk management is useful tool for companies and regulators. Companies and agencies use various risk management instruments to fulfill their responsibilities to stakeholders, and eventually society. In this respect, Kane suggests...

This paper examines how the centralization of loan decisions affects decision making in a bank. To that end, we combine field data with a lab experiment to study how loan officers change their effort to collect and share soft information about small to medium-sized applicants when their decision...