Two types of location equilibria are compared. The first one is that of a simultaneous price and location game, the second is that of a two-stage location-then-price game. It is suggested that equilibrium locations are further apart under the second and profits are higher, since firms...

Advertising messages compete for scarce attention. “Junk” mail, “spam” e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message benefit, while senders are motivated by profits. Costlier...

Many advertisements inform the consumer about product characteristics, while others give price information with very little product information, and some provide both types of information. We propose a framework to analyze the incentives for firms to provide various types of information. We...

We apply Luce's choice axiomatic framework to oligopoly pricing of quality differentiated goods. The demand system is a probabilistic comparison of surpluses across products. Zero demands arise naturally, in contrast to the related CES and Mixed Logit models. With asymmetric products, high...

We analyze a Hotelling model where consumers either buy one out of two goods (single-purchase) or both (multi-purchase). The firms’ pricing strategies turn out to be fundamentally different if some consumers multi-purchase compared to if all single-purchase. Prices are strategic complements...