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Wernerfelt, Birger - 2003

The article proposes a research program to compare game forms in terms of their ability to govern ex post adjustments to ex ante contracts. The comparisons can be based on direct implementation-costs or the extent to which desirable adjustments are not implemented. In several examples of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031253

Governance of adjustments

Wernerfelt, Birger - In: The journal of business : B 77 (2004) 2,Suppl., pp. S3-S24

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002095305

Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts : Evidence from China

Shirley, Mary M. - 2010

Performance contracts (PCs) - contracts signed between the government and state enterprise managers - have been used widely in developing countries. China's experience with such contracts was one of the largest experiments with contracting in the public sector, affecting hundreds of thousands of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012761938

Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts : Evidence from China

Shirley, Mary M.; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2010

Performance contracts (PCs) -- contracts signed between the government and state enterprise managers -- have been used widely in developing countries. China's expertise with such contracts was one of the largest experiments with contracting in the public sector, affecting hundreds of thousands...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141103

Robust Incentive Contracts

Wernerfelt, Birger - 2007

ante, we compare two contracting regimes; one with commitment to an ex ante negotiated contract, and one with an ex interim … negotiated contract. The ex ante contract can not have too strong incentives, but attempts to negotiate a stronger ex interim … contract may result in bargaining failure. The relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes therefore depends on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029266

Bargaining Before or After Communication?

Wernerfelt, Birger - 2007

We ask how bargainers' incentives to communicate about more efficient widget designs depend on whether they negotiate price prior to, or after, fixing the traded design. We find three effects: (1) Since communication reveals information about preferences, bargainers with little power prefer to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048200

Communication and Renegotiation

Wernerfelt, Birger - 2004

In a bilateral monopoly, we are looking at the seller's incentives to propose an improved widget design under two different negotiation rules. With Renegotiation, the players negotiate a price after a design has been agreed upon, and with Commitment, they negotiate the price beforehand. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029008

Designing Contracts for Complex Services

Malatesta, Deanna - 2015

perspective relevant to understanding contract design? Examining 130 professional service contracts awarded by state government … better understand contract governance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036639

The value of decentralization using the blockchain

Reuter, Marco - 2022

Although blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies have grown in popularity over the past years, there does not seem to be a consensus if they bring any value to economic interactions. In this paper, I argue that a fundamental value the blockchain provides is commitment. I develop a model of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460355

Organizational barriers to technology adoption : evidence from soccer-ball producers in Pakistan

Atkin, David J.; Chaudhry, Shahid Amjad; Chaudry, Shamyla; … - 2015

This paper studies technology adoption in a cluster of soccer-ball producers in Sialkot, Pakistan. We invented a new cutting technology that reduces waste of the primary raw material and gave the technology to a random subset of producers. Despite the arguably unambiguous net benefits of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307885

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