We analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem with moral hazard and private learning. Each period the agent faces a choice between two actions: a safe action with known returns (exploitation) and a costly risky action with unknown returns (experimentation). We explicitly characterize the cheapest...

A sender chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed ex post. A receiver obtains public information and information disclosed by the sender. Then he takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. I show that the sender...

Concerns about constructing and maintaining good reputations are known to reduce borrowers' excessive risk-taking. However, I find that the self-discipline induced by these concerns is fragile, and can break down without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. Furthermore, in the aggregate,...

Behavioral biases like disposition effect and overconfidence have received much attention as a potential driver of numerous anomalies observed in the markets. Also, it has been argued that information uncertainty tends to exacerbate these biases and induce stronger irrational behavior among...

A monopolist uses prices as an instrument to influence consumers' belief about the unknown quality of its product. Consumers observe prices and sales in earlier periods to learn about the product. Every period they decide whether to consume the product or to wait for a lower price in future. We...

This paper analyses the welfare effects of price restrictions on private contracting in a world where agents have a limited cognitive ability. People compute the costs and benefits of entering a transaction with an error. The government knows the distribution of true costs and benefits as well...

Behavioral biases like disposition effect and over-confidence have received much attention as a potential driver of numerous anomalies observed in the markets. Also, it has been argued that information uncertainty tends to exacerbate these biases and induce stronger irrational behavior among...

Consider an investment problem with strategic complementarities and incomplete information about returns. This paper shows that investors aggregate their private information in equilibrium by trading a token and observing its market price over multiple rounds before making the investment...

We consider an information design problem when the sender faces ambiguity regarding the probability distribution over the states of the world, the utility function and the prior of the receiver. The solution concept is minimax loss (regret), that is, the sender minimizes the distance from the...