where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. The paper derives several properties of the Markov perfect … and monotonic on the contracts. If the grand coalition is not efficient we show that bargaining delays arise in positive …-externality games. Otherwise, if the grand coalition is efficient, there are no bargaining delays and convergence to the grand coalition …

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in … the absence of externalities, and symmetric players are not necessarily treated symmetrically in equilibrium. If the grand …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …

efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside … the distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation in four illustrative applications …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This … the bargaining set containing a minimal winning coalition are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining … set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of …

encompasses many economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options are pure (i … distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. …