We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …

We study coalition formation problems with general externalities. We prove that if expectations are not prudent a … stable coalitions structure can fail to exist. Under prudent expectations a stable coalition structure exists if the set of … admissible coalitions is single-lapping. This assumption also guarantees the existence of a stable and efficient coalition …

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … discussion of efficient network and coalition formation procedures and directions for future research. …

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in … the absence of externalities, and symmetric players are not necessarily treated symmetrically in equilibrium. If the grand …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside … the distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation in four illustrative applications …

We study assignment problems with externalities where agents have expectations about the reactions of other agents to …