We study a game involving a firm and a newly hired employee whosecapability is initially unknown to both parties. Both players observethe performance of the employee and update their common posteriorbeliefs about the employee's capability. The learning process presentseach party with an option:...

We examine a game of harvesting a renewable common resource and investigate the ramifications of competition. We formulate the problem as an impulse control game between two competing harvesters and devise a new formulation of closed-loop impulse control strategies. In the case of non-zero setup...

We consider the problem of a firm facing failures with weak forewarning signals. In the base model that we study, the firm watches for signals of a random arrival of a disruptive innovation and continuously updates the posterior probability that a disruptive innovation has already happened. A...

Even in the face of deteriorating and highly volatile demand, firms often invest in, rather than discard, aging technologies. To study this phenomenon, we model the firm's profit stream as a Brownian motion with negative drift. At each point in time, the firm can continue operations, or it can...

We consider a stochastic game of contribution to the common good in which the players have continuous control over the degree of contribution, and we examine the gradualism arising from the free rider effect. This game belongs to the class of variable concession games which generalize wars of...

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about their competitor's exit value. We construct an...