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Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra-competitive profits....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844753
Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014529308
Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014502768
and uncover a new behavioral foundation for the use of monetary systems. In an experiment, anonymous subjects could …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011735015
We demonstrate that one should not expect convergence of the proposals to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer in standard ultimatum games. First, imposing strict experimental control of the behavior of the receiving players and focusing on the behavior of the proposers, we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075019
We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their demands, creates incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067332
negotiations. Prior research assumes that decentralized managers negotiate transfer prices autonomously. However, evidence suggests … that headquarters can become involved in transfer price negotiations, particularly after negotiation failure. While the … after negotiation failure. In an experiment, we manipulate whether headquarters involvement is absent vs. present. Nested …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985148
Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153163
Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009308812
This paper looks to see if subjects approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games featuring discounted payoffs with an option to opt out differently from how they approach long, indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games that are randomly terminated. I show under relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899722