We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually...

Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent's preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information...

A decision maker (DM) is asked to make choices from a set of acts, which entail both risk and uncertainty in the sense of knight (1921). Extending Raiffa's (1961) argument I show that, provided the DM can choose acts objectively randomly (by flipping her own fair coin, for instance), provided...

A decision maker (DM) makes choices from different sets of alternatives. The DM is initially fully ignorant of the payoff associated to each alternative, and learns these payoffs only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option once payoffs...

Ambiguity averse decision-makers can behave in financial portfolio problems in ways that cannot be rationalized as subjective expected utility maximization. Indeed, [Dow and da Costa Werlang, Econometrica 1992] show that an ambiguity-averse decision-maker might abstain from trading an asset for...