We examine whether worker representation on corporate boards results in improved monitoring or payroll maximization. Several economic theories predict that worker representatives would use control and voting rights in the boardroom to transform firm assets into private benefits and increased...

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence...

Corporate governance literature advances the idea that certain aspects of board of directors' structure improve monitoring of managerial decisions. Among these is the managers' decision to manage earnings. Prior studies have shown that earnings management, in widely-held public companies, is...

We examine the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the banking industry. By focusing on this regulated industry and using industry-specific earnings management proxies, we provide evidence on the impact of regulation on earnings management arising from CEOs' equity...

In this study, we explore the association between company reputation and the likelihood of a financial statement restatement (i.e., a revealed misstatement). We focus on restatements because they are one of the most visible forms of impaired financial reporting quality, and we suggest that...

Managers and investors frequently converse and exchange complementary private information. We develop a model to study the conversation dynamics between a myopic manager and a long-term investor. The opportunity of the investor to convey private information affects the manager's disclosure...

Events leading up to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) increased the public's focus on corporate governance and increased regulatory scrutiny of corporate governance mechanisms. These events also contributed to a massive restructuring in the audit market which resulted...

This paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial results make suboptimal investment decisions. We examine fixed asset investments for a large sample of public companies during the 1978-2002 period and document that firms that manipulate their earnings - firms investigated...

This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity...

We track the fortunes of all 2,206 individuals identified as responsible parties for all 788 SEC and Department of Justice enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from 1978 through September 30, 2006. Fully 93% lose their jobs by the end of the regulatory enforcement period. A...