We analyze the labor market for painters in Baroque Rome using unique panel data on primary sales of still lifes, portraits, genre paintings, landscapes and figurative paintings. In line with the traditional hierarchy of genres, average price differentials between them were high. We identify...

We study the XVII century market for figurative paintings in Italy, analyzing original contracts between patrons and artists: this is one of the first manufacturing markets for which econometric evidence of the basic laws of economics can be found. Size of paintings, expected quality, type of...

We derive a New Keynesian Phillips Curve under Calvo staggered pricing and price competition. Firms strategic interactions induce price adjusters to change their prices less when there are more firms that do not adjust. This reduces the slope of the Phillips curve and generates an additional...

We analyze organization of auctions and bidding strategies with a unique dataset on Paris auctions between 700s and 800s. Prices reflect the objective features of the paintings and of the sale, and they reveal a substantial death effect, with upward jumps in the years after the death of the...

We reconsider the New Keynesian model with staggered price setting when each market is characterized by a small number of firms competing in prices à la Bertrand rather than a continuum of isolated monopolists. Price adjusters change their prices less when there are more firms that do not...

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together the provision of certain public goods and policies because of spillovers. The countries are heterogeneous either in preferences and/or in economic fundamentals. The trade off between the benefits of coordination and the...

We study platforms competing in commissions on revenues of sellers engaged in monopolistic competition, as the app providers on the app stores of iPhones and Android devices. Free entry of sellers on each platform generates multihoming superstars and a long tail of singlehoming sellers....

We provide a unified approach to imperfect (monopolistic, Bertrand and Cournot) competition equilibria with demand functions derived from symmetric preferences over a large but finite number of goods. The equilibrium markups depend on the Morishima Elasticity of Substitution/Complementarity...