We study competitive behavior in all-pay Tullock (1980) contests with identity-dependent externalities (IDEs) governed by a fixed network. First, we introduce a model of network contest games, in which the prize generates an externality---which may be positive or negative---that impacts each...

This work studies a strategic game with incomplete information in which a finite number of players simultaneously choose actions and form either unilaterally or bilaterally relationships. The players' payoffs are supermodular in actions but do exhibit neither negative nor positive spillovers;...

We study the impact of research collaborations in coauthorship networks on research output and how optimal funding can maximize it. Through the links in the collaboration network, researchers create spillovers not only to their direct coauthors but also to researchers indirectly linked to them....

We study the impact of research collaborations in coauthorship networks on research output and how optimal funding can maximize it. Through the links in the collaboration network, researchers create spillovers not only to their direct coauthors but also to researchers indirectly linked to them....

We study the impact of research collaborations in coauthorship networks on research output and how optimal funding can maximize it. Through the links in the collaboration network, researchers create spillovers not only to their direct coauthors but also to researchers indirectly linked to them....

We study a model of transmission of continuous cultural traits across generations where children learn their cultural trait from their parents and their social environment modeled by a network. Parents can engage in the socialization process of their children by biasing links in the network in...

We study a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks. In our model, boundedly rational agents update opinions by averaging over their neighbors’ expressed opinions, but may misrepresent their own opinion by conforming or counter-conforming with their neighbors. We show that an...

This paper develops a model of noncooperative network formation. Link formation is two-sided. Information flow is two-way. The paper is based on Bala and Goyal (2000) with the following difference in assumption: the value of information decays as it flows through each agent, and the decay is...

We study a coordination problem where agents act sequentially. Agents are embedded in anobservation network that allows them to observe the actions of their neighbors. We find thatcoordination failures do not occur if there exists a sufficiently large clique. Its existence isnecessary and...