The participation deficit in global governance is usually blamed on power politics; we argue it may actually reflect strategic behavior by excluded countries themselves. In the WTO, member-states affected by a trade dispute can join litigation as `third parties' to gain access to otherwise...

Countries can challenge potential trade violations using the WTO's dispute settlement system, yet many policies that appear to violate WTO rules remain unchallenged, even when they have a significant economic impact. Why is this? We argue that the likelihood that a country challenges a...

We argue that economic links, such as supply chains, can create a common roof that protects foreign investors in host countries that lack strong institutions to protect property rights. Supply chains link the activities of firms: when a host government breaks a contract with one firm, other...

I examine the impact of depth and rigidity in international trade agreements. Increasing the depth of required cooperation lowers the likelihood of full compliance and the stability of a trade regime. In contrast, increasing the rigidity of an agreement raises the likelihood of full compliance...

When voters evaluate their executive’s policies, they often possess information that was previously unknown to policy makers. Should voters use such ex post information? The author presents a model of executive evaluation following an international crisis. Using ex post information can be...

International bureaucrats must often serve multiple principals who collectively choose policy. How does this affect bureaucrats' incentives to truthfully reveal their private information? I construct a cheap talk model in which a bureaucrat possesses private information about how policies...

The past three decades have witnessed the development of a rich literature that applies the formal tools of game theory to understanding international cooperation and international institutions. We divide this literature into three “generations” of scholarship. With a few notable exceptions,...