When managing a project with uncertain completion time and unobservable contractor's work rate, self-interest can create conflicts between the project manager and the contractor leading to actions that reduce the profits of both. We first investigate how the concept of supply contract...

We investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns. We examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which (i) a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of...

We investigate a game of singular control and strategic exit in a model of competitive market share control. In the model, each player can make irreversible investments to increase his market share which is modeled as a diffusion process. In addition, each player has an option to exit the market...

We consider the problem of a firm facing failures with weak forewarning signals. In the base model that we study, the firm watches for signals of a random arrival of a disruptive innovation and continuously updates the posterior probability that a disruptive innovation has already happened. A...

Even in the face of deteriorating and highly volatile demand, firms often invest in, rather than discard, aging technologies. To study this phenomenon, we model the firm's profit stream as a Brownian motion with negative drift. At each point in time, the firm can continue operations, or it can...