We show that parties in bilateral trade can rely on the default common law breach remedy of '€˜expectation damages' to induce simultaneously ?rst-best relationship-speci?c investments of both the sel?sh and the cooperative kind. This can be achieved by writing a contract that speci?es a...

We show that parties in bilateral trade can rely on the default common law breach remedy of 'expectation damages' to induce simultaneously first-best relationship-specific investments of both the selfish and the cooperative kind. This can be achieved by writing a contract that specifies a...

We show that parties in bilateral trade can rely on the default common law breach remedy of ‘expectation damages’ to induce simultaneously ?rst-best relationship-speci?c investments of both the sel?sh and the cooperative kind. This can be achieved by writing a contract that speci?es...

We show that parties in bilateral trade can rely on the default common law breach remedy of ‘expectation damages’ to simultaneously induce first-best relationship-specific investments of both the selfish and the cooperative kind. This can be achieved by writing a contract that specifies a...

We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...