Should a monopolistic vendor adopt the selling model or the leasing model for information goods or services? We study this question in the context of consumer valuation depreciation. Using a two-period game-theoretic model, we consider two types of consumer-side valuation depreciation for...

The axiomatic route to the foundation of contest success functions (CSF) has proved to be both useful and prolific. The standard approach in the literature is based on the decision-theoretic notion that choice probabilities should be independent of irrelevant alternatives (Skaperdas, Economic...

Our underlying hypothesis is that technological progress (even neutral) has a big effect on distribution, not only on growth, since rising waves of technical progress cause rising monopoly power. We test it by showing that, since the 1970's, information technology (in short IT) has caused rising...

We consider a general screening model with payoff externalities and type-dependent feasibility constraints. The principal can design contract instruments of arbitrary dimension to influence each agent's valuation of the proposed transaction, which also depends on the anticipated choice of other...

A fallacy lies at the core of modern antitrust. The ascendance of the consumer welfare standard is a story often told. Yet existing narratives overlook the pivotal role that output has played--and continues to play--in shaping the contemporary antitrust enterprise. That role has gone unnoticed...

We propose a tractable framework to introduce externalities in a screening model. Agents differ in both payoff-type and influence (how strongly their actions affect others). Applications range from pricing network goods to regulating industries that create externalities. Inefficiencies arise...

A problem that has plagued market failure discussions is: "why does bad policy exist and persist?" Various schools of thought have answered that question, but I argue that the explanations, while correct, are incomplete. In this paper, I apply the expert failure literature to the problem of...

This paper extends the canonical literature on public incentives for firm-level abatement by introducing fiscal policy constraints and public abatement technologies. To increase acceptance of the emission tax policy, tax revenues are earmarked for public abatement or public good provision and no...

Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role...

This paper studies the problem of a monopolistic platform which offers agents connection with one another. Agents have heterogeneous characteristics that are valued by some other agents and observed privately by the principal. The agents are privately informed about their heterogeneous...