Merger review in the United States has overlooked a significant competition harm: increasing risk. Mergers can increase both direct and systemic risk. There is now persuasive evidence that negative shocks to a firm can harm the firm’s consumers and trading partners, leading to national...

Choice spillovers across behavioral domains are important for market- ing, as they suggest that interventions in one choice domain may have far-reaching, and countervailing influences, in other domains. Using a novel dataset drawn from a university population, we study individual- level exercise...

This chapter first describes the standard economic analysis of privacy, data protection and surveillance, looking at the costs and benefits to different parties and the incentives each therefore has, as well as the aggregate social welfare impacts of their decisions. It then considers the market...

It is often argued that without tax-exemptions for the production sector environmental tax reforms substantially reduce profits and endanger employment. We challenge this view and investigate the consequences of both a small and alarge tax reform in the case of a monopoly. We show that these...

In nonlinear pricing environment with correlated types, we characterize optimal selling mechanisms when buyers could form a coalition to coordinate their reports and to arbitrage on the goods. We find that when the types of agents are weakly positively correlated, the optimal weakly...

I study the optimal supply of exible commitment devices to people who value both commitment and exibility, and whose preferences exhibit varying degrees of time incon- sistency. I …nd that, if time inconsistency is observable, then both a monopolist and a planner supply devices that enable each...

We study the market for vaccinations considering income heterogeneity on the demand side and monopoly power on the supply side. A monopolist has an incentive to exploit the external effect of vaccinations and leave the poor susceptible in order to increase the willingness to pay of the rich....

We study how optimally to insure customers of a unionized firm, such as an auto maker, against the loss of network benefits that occurs when other consumers abandon the firm.  The union first announces a wage.  A random demand shock is then realized.  The firm then chooses its price and,...

This paper considers the screening problem faced by a monopolist of a network good in a general setting. We demonstrate that the joint presence of asymmetric information and network externalities revise the "no distortion on the top" and "one-way distortion" principle. The pattern of consumption...

This paper provides a new explanation for the dominance of the low-powered incentive contract over the high-powered incentive contract using a mixed model of moral hazard and adverse selection. We first show that the power of incentives in the second-best contract is lower than that in the...