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In this paper we introduce an extension of the model of restricted communication in cooperative games as introduced in … Myerson (1977) by allowing communication links to be directed and the worth of a coalition to depend on the order in which the … players enter the coalition. Therefore, we model the communication network by a directed graph and the cooperative game by a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373812
. Two well-known network structures are hierarchies and communication networks. We give an overview of the most common … models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in cooperative games, compare different network structures with each other … and discuss network structures that combine communication as well as hierarchical features. Throughout the survey, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434059
We consider a communications network in which users transmit beneficial information to each other at a cost. We pinpoint conditions under which the induced cooperative game is supermodular (convex). Our analysis is in a lattice-theoretic framework, which is at once simple and able to encompass a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779071
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010190658
We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014505372
-Ichiishi result. Other applications range from computation of stable sets in non-cooperative game theory to determination of classes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809135
theory of games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307317, 1953) to characterize our value. In addition, we … average approach provided by Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). -- externalities ; marginal contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355896
On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506430
We resolve redundancies in the characterizations of the Banzhaf value suggested by Haller (1994, Int J Game Theory 23 …, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009311608
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372977