Because uncertainties around innovative technologies resolve over time, investments in such technologies are often made in stages so that organizations can use the knowledge gained from earlier stages to decide the next step. Previous studies usually assume that once some uncertainty is...

The epilogue to Supply Chain Partners: Virginia Mason and Owens & Minor (A), the B case details the outcome of the issues discussed in Case A; namely that Virginia Mason and Owens & Minor did implement the TSCC contract. Virginia Mason also kept the suture contract with O&M because the TSCC model...

Virginia Mason Medical Center (VM) hired Owens & Minor (O&M) as its alpha vendor for medical/surgical supplies in 2004. By 2005, O&M was performing JIT and LUM services for VM, but they believed the pricing model in the industry was outdated. VM and O&M partnered to create the Total Supply Chain...

This chapter reviews the recent economic literature on transfer pricing. As a starting point, we take Hirshleifer's transfer pricing model and discuss the basic structure of the most widely used model extensions. We review transfer pricing models with asymmetric information, transfer pricing...

The benefit of non-information rationing aggregate performance evaluation is studied in a limited commitment setting. Depending on the prior distribution of the managerial skill parameter, an equal bonus rule, that is intertemporal aggregation of performance measures, can be efficient as it...

In this teaching note I list some suggestions that might be useful to take into account when forecasting financial statements departing from historical data. The ideas presented in this note are the result of advising undergraduate and graduate students in the course Econ 195.96/295.96...

Conventional cost accounting assumes that the relation between cost and volume is symmetric for volume increases and decreases. We test an alternative model where costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. We find, for a sample of...

We model career concerns in a regime where a linear incentive contract includes a mix of a publicly observed performance measure and a second, correlated, private measure that is not observed by the labor market. Under this quot;mixquot; regime, we find that agent effort and total agency payoff...