for highway procurement when unobserved auction heterogeneity is present. I derive sufficient conditions under which the … question. The estimation procedure is applied to data from Michigan highway procurement auctions. I estimate that 75% of the … information. My results suggest that failing to account for unobserved auction heterogeneity may lead to overestimating …

We consider two mechanisms to procure differentiated goods: a request for quote and an English auction with bidding … the seller who offers the greatest difference in quality and price. In the English auction with bidding credits, the buyer … English auction with the winner receiving the auction price and his bidding credit. Game theoretic models predict the request …

In procurement auctions, there are situations where a bidder's cost is uncertain at the time of bidding, leading to a … "winner's curse." We use bridgework data from the State of Oklahoma and an empirical auction model to explore whether the … winner's curse also affects entry, which can have serious implications for procurement costs and efficiency. We find that the …

the economic theory of incentives, procurement and regulation. In particular, we analyse alternative funding mechanisms to … for greenfield projects where little demand information is initially available. We discuss the procurement of highway PPPs …

the economic theory of incentives, procurement and regulation. In particular, we analyse alternative funding mechanisms to … for greenfield projects where little demand information is initially available. We discuss the procurement of highway PPPs …