information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that … obtain high-powered incentives and, hence, a high personal income at the merger-management stage. …

. Collectively, our findings suggest that managerial incentives can motivate managers to abandon the novel “disclosure substitution …We examine the relation between managerial incentives and disclosure. Specifically, we examine how contracts that … explicitly evaluate managers relative to peer performance are associated with: (1) the transparency of mandatory disclosure; (2 …

I show that stochastic contracts generate powerful incentives when agents suffer from probability distortion. When …

The extant literature has used measurements of CEO risk-taking incentives which do not include the effects of …-taking incentives but also proposes a new, more direct, measure of risk-taking incentives — compensation gamma. Results show that vega …-taking incentives under normal conditions …

it can destroy the ex ante efficient trade-off between risk and incentives under the presence of renegotiation …

We derive a measure that captures the extent to which common ownership shifts managers' incentives to internalize … analyzing whether the growth of common ownership affects managerial incentives …

One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk … obtain that lower agent’s risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking …

information about the technology, and both seek robust performance from a contract in relation to their respective worst … flattening of the high-powered incentives. Methodologically, we provide a tractable way to formulate and characterize optimal … robustness and simplicity of dynamic contracts, in particular that presence of ambiguity flattens high-powered incentives …

, teams should get more risk-loving as they fall further behind, matching prospect theory preferences. When leading, risk …