This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the efforts of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice to detect, indict, and deter horizontal collusion during 1990-2007 and offers policy suggestions likely to improve that enforcement. Division leaders emphasize that collusion is the...

This paper is a comprehensive examination of the global bulk vitamins cartels of the 1990s. In terms of its precision and breadth of coverage, the quantitative information now available on vitamins surpasses that of almost any other modern cartel. For example, the internal records of the major...

International cartelists today face antitrust investigations and possible fines in a score of national and supranational jurisdictions. This paper aims at providing quantitative information about the size and impacts of international cartel activity in Asia and uses a sample of modern private...

This article analyzes the first 22 cartel decisions of the European Commission under its 2006 revised fining Guidelines. I find that the severity of the cartel fines relative to affected sales is about double that of the fines decided under the previous 1998 Guidelines. Severity varies only...

In this paper, we estimate quantitatively the determinants of variation in administrative fines imposed on companies by the European Commission for price-fixing violations. Estimates from our behavioral model provide the first direct test of the predictive power of the optimal deterrence theory...

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union and the United States are at the optimal levels. The article does this by collecting and analyzing the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard core pricing...

In this paper I aim to explain accepted methods of forensic analysis and how forensic economics is used in the context of competition-law enforcement. I illustrate forensic analysis with examples from antitrust cases involving price fixing. I define forensic economics as economic analysis...

This paper assesses the antitrust fines and private penalties imposed on the participants of 260 international cartels discovered during 1990-2005, using four indicators of enforcement effectiveness. First, the United States is almost always the first to investigate and sanction international...

This paper models a key outcome of secret negotiations: partial-leniency fine discounts from plea bargaining in criminal price-fixing cases. Models tested explain up to 52% of variation in percentage discounts. A minor portion is explained by such defendants characteristics as the defendant s...

This paper analyzes the first 13 cartel decisions of the European Commission under its 2006 revised fining guidelines. I find that the severity of the cartel fines is more than five times higher than those figured under the previous 1998 Guidelines. For the first time in antitrust history, I...