We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The … institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we … observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the …

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The … institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we … observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the …

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The … institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we … observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the …

subjects to punish free-riders increases cooperation in the public goods game, and that the degree of punishment is sensitive … cadets' reluctance or willingness to punish non-cooperators in a public goods experiment. We employ a standard public goods … game with punishment, but in addition to knowing how much each player contributed to the group good, subjects also know the …

This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer …. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other …, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the …

We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long … time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher … cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii ) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances …

levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment …

This paper studies how the existence of counter-punishment opportunities affects cooperation and welfare when agents … face a social dilemma. Using a public-good game we find that under the threat of counter-punishment cooperators are less … willing to punish free-riders. As a result, under both fixed and random matching, the fear of counter-punishment to a large …

We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long … time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher … cooperation, if (i) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances in …

¤ects individuals' willingness to engage in altruistic punishment in a public good experiment in which the number of stages is …Altruistic punishment may promote cooperation, but can also lead to costly feuds. We examine how the threat of feuds a … determined by participants' actions. The design allows participants to use a range of punishment strategies. We nd that …