paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second … independently from the identity of the winner. We prove that the first-price auction is not affected by this kind of price-externalities … by the presence of such price-externalities. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second …

-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of … the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general …, however, the presence of identity-dependent externalities invalidates well-established qualitative results concerning the set …

-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of … the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general …, however, the presence of identity-dependent externalities invalidates well-established qualitative results concerning the set …

In auctions with externalities, the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. We …

In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of …

negative externalities. Our results are consistent with previous experimental findings that bidders tend to overbid more in … externalities …

How agents assess the (in-)tangible externalities that others might impose on them can strongly influence strategic … externalities, are all subject to asymmetric information; utility is quasi-linear and transferable. An allocation rule will be …-balanced transfers if and only if it maximizes the sum of private payoffs exclusive of externalities. The corresponding mechanism is …