I look at data from an experiment in which people rank apples according to how they think they will taste. They are then blindfolded and rank how they actually taste. I estimate a multinomial rank-ordered probit model with correlated errors between the taste and visual rankings. I find that the...

We construct a model of technology adoption with agents differing on two dimensions: their cognitive ability and their receptiveness to advice. While cognitive ability unambiguously speeds adoption, receptiveness to advice may speed adoption for individuals with low cognitive ability, but slow...

Experimental economists believe (and enforce) that researchers should not employ deception in the design of experiments. The rule exists in order to protect a public good: the ability of other researchers to conduct experiments and have participants trust their instructions to be an accurate...

The relative price of locally-produced milk and cheese in rural Paraguay is puzzling, apparently leaving opportunities for arbitrage. Despite requiring additional labor and inputs, the price of cheese per liter of milk is lower than the price of a liter of fluid milk. We propose a framework of...

We study the extent to which collusion can explain the under-provision of clean sanitation technologies in developing countries. Using desludging services in Dakar as a case-study, we document that prices are 66% higher in areas where prices are likely coordinated by a large trade association,...

Rural areas of developing countries often lack effective legal enforcement. However, villagers who know each other well and interact repeatedly may use implicit contracts to minimize crime. I construct a dynamic limited-commitment model in which a thief cannot credibly commit to forego stealing...

Play in the traditional trust experiment depends both on trust beliefs and on levels of risk aversion. We ran two experiments with a diverse set of subjects in fifteen villages of rural Paraguay, the traditional trust experiment and a new experiment measuring only risk aversion. We find that...

Rabin (2000) argues that, under expected-utility, observed risk aversion over modest stakes implies extremely high risk aversion over large stakes. Cox & Sadiraj (2006) have replied that this is a problem of expected-utility of wealth, but that expected-utility of income does not share that...