We analyze demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that the nature of the private information determines the market power of the agents and thus price and volume of equilibrium trade.We establish our results by providing a characterization of...

We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out "third degree price discrimination."We...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information in fluences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic...

Foreword -- Introduction -- Robust mechanism design -- Ex post implementation -- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms -- Robust implementation in general mechanisms -- The role of the common prior in robust implementation -- An ascending auction for interdependent values : uniqueness and...