We study the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must...

Suppose a decision maker (DM), in the language of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), has preferences over acts (horse-race lotteries) that satisfy the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) axioms for objective lotteries (constant acts) and Anscombe and Aumann's (1963) Axioms of Reversal of Order and...

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with preplay communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes....

Consider a symmetric 2-player game of complete information. Consider an arbitrary Bayesian extension of that game with payoff-irrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity (private types). We show that, in this setting, while strategies in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game...

We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually...

Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state independent. We perform two robustness checks of this result. First, we show that only the...