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The Condorcet Jury Theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members only commit one type of error. If the probability of this error is smaller than 0.5, then group decisions are better than those of individual members. In binary decision situations, however, two types of error...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950609
This paper presents results on the transitivity of the majority relation and the existence of a median representative ordering. Building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, the analysis extends well-known results obtained when the underlying graph is a line. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506448
-proofness ; implementation theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506479
We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012893731
The nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem states that, under certain conditions, group decision-making by simple majority voting can decide more efficiently than single-person decision-making, in terms of having a higher probability of choosing the better alternative. Wit (1998) showed that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849943
We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316013
The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997154
We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals who rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals who rank it among the least preferred half. A Condorcet winner may not be socially acceptable. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912892
For committee or multiwinner elections, the Chamberlin-Courant rule (CCR), which combines the Borda rule and the proportional representation, aims to pick the most representative committee (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983). Chamberlin and Courant (1983) have shown that if the size of the committee...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012916561
A theory is developed to explain all positional voting outcomes that can result from a single but arbitrarily chosen … discrepancies in rankings as candidates are dropped or added. The theory explains why each outcome occurs while identifying all … outcomes. Pairwise voting is addressed in the preceding companion paper [15]; the theory for positional methods is developed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175733