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Who will vote quadratically? : voter turnout and votes cast under quadratic voting

Kaplow, Louis; Kominers, Scott Duke - 2016

Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core QV literature assumes that everyone votes, turnout is endogenous. Drawing on other work, we consider the representativeness of endogenously determined turnout under QV. Second,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011578439

On the representativeness of voter turnout

Kaplow, Louis; Kominers, Scott Duke - 2020

Prominent theory research on voting uses models in which expected pivotality drives voters' turnout decisions and hence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200354

Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes : Ii. Positional Voting

Saari, Donald G. - 2000

A theory is developed to explain all positional voting outcomes that can result from a single but arbitrarily chosen … discrepancies in rankings as candidates are dropped or added. The theory explains why each outcome occurs while identifying all … outcomes. Pairwise voting is addressed in the preceding companion paper [15]; the theory for positional methods is developed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175733

Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes : I. Pairwise Votes

Saari, Donald G. - 2000

A theory is developed to identify, characterize, and explain all possible positional and pairwise voting outcomes that …" and "losers." The theory also shows how to construct all supporting profiles. The following companion paper does the same …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175748

The Likelihood of Dubious Election Outcomes

Saari, Donald G.; Tataru, Maria M. - 1999

A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each possible choice, some set of voters can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200399

The Probability of the Paradox of Voting for Weak Preference Orderings

Van Deemen, Adrian - 2008

In this paper the probability of the voting paradox for weak orderings is calculated analytically for the three-voter-three-alternative case. It appears that the probability obtained this way is considerably smaller than in the corresponding case for linear orderings. The probability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202552

The Precedent-Based Voting Paradox

Cohen, David S. - 2010

over the Court’s history. In this Article, drawing mostly on social choice theory, I describe and model a particular kind …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206477

Condorcet Jury Theorem : The Dependent Case

Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shemuʾel - 2008

We provide an extension of the Condorcet Theorem. Our model includes both the Nitzan-Paroush framework of "unequal competencies" and Ladha's model of "correlated voting by the jurors". We assume that the jurors behave "informatively", that is, they do not make a strategic use of their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219338

Multi-Winner Scoring Election Methods : Condorcet Consistency and Paradoxes

Diss, Mostapha - 2016

The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997154

Condorcet Winners and Social Acceptability

Mahajne, Muhammad - 2018

We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals who rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals who rank it among the least preferred half. A Condorcet winner may not be socially acceptable. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912892