Standard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss...

We examine the effect on expected flotation costs of including co-managers in the underwriting syndicate. We consider five components of SEO flotation costs: announcement returns, underpricing, the probability of withdrawals, offering delays, and underwriting spreads. The results show that the...

This study considers a single-period monopolistic insurance market with adverse selection and moral hazard. We find that, where the distortions introduced by moral hazard are sufficiently moderate, the insurer can use price-quantity contracts as a mechanism to simultaneously deal with both...

Monday IPOs occur infrequently and have higher mean initial returns than those issued on other days. The latter result is not a product of outliers or penny stocks and remains after controlling for factors related to IPO underpricing. The Monday effect is generally robust across time, but during...