This study considers a single-period monopolistic insurance market with adverse selection and moral hazard. We find that, where the distortions introduced by moral hazard are sufficiently moderate, the insurer can use price-quantity contracts as a mechanism to simultaneously deal with both...

Booth and Chua (1996) suggest that underpricing may boost secondary market liquidity of an initial public offering (IPO), but to date there is little evidence on this point. In this study, we employ ten measures of liquidity to explore whether the underpricing of IPOs boosts subsequent secondary...

We examine the effect on expected flotation costs of including co-managers in the underwriting syndicate. We consider five components of SEO flotation costs: announcement returns, underpricing, the probability of withdrawals, offering delays, and underwriting spreads. The results show that the...

Empirical research has shown that hospitals have higher than average leverage, the extent of leverage is related to the extent of cost-based reimbursement, and not-for-profit hospitals are not as highly levered as their for-profit counterparts. Previous theoretical work does not unambiguously...

Standard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss...