Protection unconstrained by rules typically varies considerably over time. The policy disciplines introduced in the Uruguay Round in `new' areas such as agricultural, services, and developing country industrial protection will constrain, but not eliminate, this variability. The effects of these...

This paper studies the evolution of regional specialization in China in response to trade liberalization. Using a panel of Chinese export data at the detailed commodity level over the period of 1988–2006, we show that China’s regional specialization follows a U-shaped pattern: both the...

Mit einem umfassenden und in der Öffentlichkeit höchst umstrittenen Handels- und Investitionsabkommen (TTIP) wollen die EU und die USA die größte Freihandelszone der Welt errichten und damit Wachstum und Beschäftigung stimulieren. Zwar prognostizieren alle bisherigen TTIP-Studien positive...

We study the stability of trade policy arrangements under two regulatory scenarios, with/without PTAs. Unlike previous papers, we consider an extensive set of trade policy constellations and allow for unlimited farsightedness of negotiating parties. We find global free trade (GFT) to be uniquely...

This paper derives Abreu's (1986) stick-and-carrot strategy optimal penal codes in a partial equilibrium model that has been widely used to examine trade liberalization. Unless the asymmetry between countries is significant, the optimal penal codes take simple form. It is also shown that the...

Trade policies such as tariffs are often featured by the prisoners' dilemma. One country's trade liberalization is vulnerable to the opportunism of another country. This problem is more serious in cases where a country behaving opportunistically can only be punished by the victims. In a trade...

In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to policymakers who maximise tax revenue rather than welfare. However, both countries delegating to policymakers who maximise revenue is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. The game may be a...

In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to policymakers who maximise tax revenue rather than welfare. However, both countries delegating to policymakers who maximise revenue is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. The game may be a...

This paper shows nonemptiness of the core of a customs union game with a status quo equilibrium with tariffs by employing an appropriate notion of the core as in Kowalczyk and Sjöström (1994, Economica). Specifically, we find that if customs unions may have no effects on non-member countries...

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium trade model with comparative advantage, heterogeneous firms, heterogeneous workers and endogenous firm entry to study wage inequality during the adjustment after trade liberalization. We find that trade liberalization increases wage inequality both in the...