The paper Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation, by Harris, Kriebel and Raviv (H.K.R.), was published in the June 1982 issue of Management Science. In this article, written as part of this journal's 50-year anniversary celebration, we highlight the significance of...

This paper analyzes strategic transfer pricing with risk and effort averse divisional managers. In contrast to earlier literature, we find that the existence of a standard agency problem allows transfer pricing to serve as a commitment device even if the transfer prices are not mutually...

We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives affects the organization of business activities, both the internal organization of the firm and the determination of firm...

This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in duopoly market structure, if the managers' salary varies with the incentive schemes offered by the owners, then the well-known results of equilibrium incentive scheme (by Fershtman and Judd, 1987, A.E.R.) get modified. In case of...

In economies with a growing service sector, the importance of intangible assets like brands, customer relationships, and organizational capabilities is rapidly increasing, as is the importance of information and knowledge for the production of goods and services. New concepts in such areas as...

This study uses principal agent analysis to investigate how the principal’s use of performance measures in the agent’s compensation contract are affected by (1) links between performance measures and (2) substitute and complementary characteristics of an agent’s efforts. We show that the...