A player's strategy, for an n-person infinitely repeated game with discounting, is subjectively rational if it is a best response to his individual beliefs regarding opponents' strategies. A vector of such strategies is a subjective equilibrium if the play induced by it is realization equivalent...

We study merging, in a few senses, of two measures when increasing sequence of information is observed. Motivating this extension of Blackwell and Dubins' (1962) work, are studies of convergence to equilibrium in infinite games and in dynamic economies.

Under the rational expectation s assumption of Muth, economic agents use their perfect knowledge of the distribution of future prices to compute optimal current actions. In private forecasts equilibrium, intorduced here, agents use subjective in accurate forecasts about future prices to compute...

Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian or correlated equilibrium to analysis of strategic interaction, requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games, and subjective Nash...

We show that any correlation device with rational coefficients can be generated by a mechanism where each player sends a private message to a mediator who in turn makes a public deterministic announcement. Moreover, the mechanism suggested is immunized against individual deviations.

We deal with the concept of e-consistent equilibrium which corresponds to strategies inducing an e-equilbrium in any subgame reached along the play path. Examples and existence conditions are given.