We present a simple classroom principal-agent experiment that can effectively be used as a teaching device to introduce … design a contract that consists of a fixed payment and an incentive component. In the second part, students take the role of … agents and decide on an effort level. The experiment can be used to introduce students to the concepts of efficiency …

We investigate how payoff-irrelevant terms can negatively impact relational contracts. In a lab experiment we compare … two economically equivalent contracts - a fixed-term renewable and an open-ended at-will contract. Each contract provides … partners with full flexibility regarding the length and termination of their interaction. When only one contract type is …

, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …

, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …

, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts, which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …

intent, that can cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment that provides the material circumstances necessary for …

laboratory experiment in which the choice of the job characteristics (i.e., the mission) is part of the compensation package that …

, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated by a team leader. Our experiment examines these mechanisms in both …

an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort …