In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core … equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core. -- marriage problem ; G-weak core ; G-strong core …-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to …

In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game … theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can …

We study the marriage problem where a probability distribution over matchings is chosen. The “core” has been central to …

We study marriage problems where two groups of agents match to each other and probabilistic assignments are possible … assignment belongs to the core: no coalition can deviate to another probabilistic assignment among themselves and achieve a …

in the marriage market: in this case the ω-core and the α-core coincide and are both non-empty. In addition, we show that …We consider marriage markets with externalities. We focus on weak externalities, that is, markets in which each agent …

stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and perform a study on the core of the … the existence of a stable solution and the non-emptiness of the core, which holds in the other models with payments, is no …

coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …

In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those …