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We study the marriage problem where a probability distribution over matchings is chosen. The “core” has been central to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183378
In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core … equivalence of the G-weak core and the G-strong core. -- marriage problem ; G-weak core ; G-strong core …-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in which blocking power is restricted to the coalitions belonging to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321312
For marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find … all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and … marriage markets by adding individual rationality and by replacing anonymity with gender fairness. We generalize both results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222181
We study marriage problems where two groups of agents match to each other and probabilistic assignments are possible … assignment belongs to the core: no coalition can deviate to another probabilistic assignment among themselves and achieve a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014143817
In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game … theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891127
stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and perform a study on the core of the … the existence of a stable solution and the non-emptiness of the core, which holds in the other models with payments, is no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345044
coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650908
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219020
well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multi-valued. We define a condition on such … core allocation in the model with no indifference). We prove that a game has a nonempty strict core if and only if it is … either a strict core allocation or a report that the strict core is empty. Finally, we are also able to construct a linear …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084462
strongly balanced and the core is described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with … between core and competitive equilibria is established …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964721