The paper proposes a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital structure, managerial incentives, and firms' ability to sustain collusive agreements. It shows that shareholders' commitments that reduce conflicts with debtholders such as hiring...

This paper investigates the determinants of liability maturity choice in transition markets. We formulate a model of firm value maximization that describes managers' choice of optimal debt structure. The theoretical predictions are tested using a unique panel of 4,300 Ukrainian firms during the...

The paper aims at empirically investigating the relationship between regulation and the capital structure of the regulated firm, A key aspect of the referred relationship pertains a leverage effect according to which debt could be increased as a response to previous physical capital investment...

The capital structure of firms is known to be different not only due to firm characteristics but also to the sources of capital. Therefore, there is a need to understand the supply side effects on a firm´s capital structure. A small firm´s choice of financing sources may be limited by the...

Empirical studies examining the financing decisions of the firm focus exclusively on publicly held firms, not family-controlled firms despite their economic importance. This study investigates the external financing behavior of family-controlled firms, using a comprehensive sample of 777 large...

Tax neutrality towards alternative financing instruments for corporate investment is a ubiquitous demand in the political debate. At the same time, the literature is surprisingly silent about the magnitude of possible efficiency costs of a departure from tax neutrality. Against this background,...

Multinational companies can exploit the tax advantage of debt more aggressively than national companies by shifting debt from affiliates in low tax countries to affiliates in high tax countries. Previous papers have either omitted internal debt or external debt from the analysis. We are the...

This paper develops a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which optimal contracts resemble a combination of debt and equity. When defaulting on debt, the firm is punished by disruption of external funding. Such contracts however, invite rivals to compete more aggressively to...

The current EU rules governing the solvency of insurance companies essentially base the required minimum equity capital on the volume of insurance business the companies write. Thus, no attempt is made to identify or quantify the central risks borne by insurance companies. In response to...

This paper analyzes the determinants of the capital structure for a panel of 106 Swiss companies listed in the Swiss stock exchange.