the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable … coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. -- Coalition formation ; Hedonic games ; Separability …

We consider hedonic games with separable preferences, and explore the existence of stable coalition structures if only …) aversion to enemies and (2) appreciation of friends, we show that an individually stable coalition structure always exist, and … a Nash stable coalition structure exists when mutuality is imposed. Moreover, we show that on the domain of separable …

to the best aspect of each coalition, and is shown to be a sufficient conditaion for the existence of core stable … coalition structures. In this paper, we propose a new concept, called bottom refuseness, for modeling societies with … conservative players, i.e., each player pays more attention to the worst aspect of each coalition, and has tendency to choose among …

the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable … coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. …

the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable … coalition tructures always exist, and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of con- ractually Nash stable and weak … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. …

We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations … are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A … coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a profitable group deviation to some network and there is no …