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Foreclosure, Predation and Competition on the Merits : An Analysis of Bundled Discounts
Faella, Gianluca - 2009
distinguish exclusionary conduct from legitimate competition. Currently, there is no general consensus on the treatment of the … principles on foreclosure could prevent the use of an effective competitive tool and may result in reduced price competition and … portion of demand for the) product(s) reasonably open to competition. This test is based on the idea that a practice should be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014211539
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The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties
Elhauge, Einer - 2017
Critics of current tying doctrine argue that metering ties can increase consumer welfare and total welfare without increasing output and that they generally increase both welfare measures. Contrary to those claims, we prove that metering ties always lower consumer welfare and total welfare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971898
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The Competitive Effects of Sports Exclusivity
Klein, Timo - 2023
? Recent EU competition cases including European Super League and International Skating Union have made this a particularly … process of collective value creation helps in assessing necessity and proportionality under EU competition law. I also discuss …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254661
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Loyalty Discounts, Exclusive Dealing and Bundling : Rule of Reason, Quasi-Per-Se, Price-Cost Test, or Something in between?
Eilat, Assaf - 2016
The article reviews loyalty rebates, target rebates, exclusive dealing, and bundling, and argues that these are analogous practices that deserve similar competitive analyses and rules. In particular, in the case of all of these practices, at least some marginal units are typically sold below...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986007
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Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting
Lambert, Thomas A. - 2011
Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397 (Dec. 2009), contests two propositions on which efficiency-minded antitrust scholars …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185177
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Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing
Abbott, Alden F.; Wright, Joshua D. - 2008
This chapter surveys the legal and economic literatures on the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts. We review the analytical framework applied under U.S. antitrust law to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements as well as the existing theoretical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217373
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Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Discounts
Lambert, Thomas A. - 2006
The Third Circuit's decision in Lepage's v. 3M created a great deal of uncertainty about the legality of so-called bundled discounts - i.e., discounts (or rebates) conditioned upon purchasing multiple products from disparate product markets. This paper, prepared for a joint Department of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054231
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Bundled Rebates as Exclusionary, Not Predatory
Brennan, Tim - 2007
Prevailing tests for whether bundled rebate programs are anticompetitive, including the recent Antitrust Modernization Commission Recommendation 17, are based on whether some incremental or total price in the rebate program is less than some appropriate incremental cost. This test is based upon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026040
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Tying, Bundling, and Loyalty/Requirement Rebates
Economides, Nicholas - 2011
show that the Chicago School Theory of a single monopoly surplus that justifies tying, bundling, and loyalty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014187801
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Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory
Elhauge, Einer - 2009
Chicago School theorists have argued that tying cannot create anticompetitive effects because there is only a single monopoly profit. Some Harvard School theorists have argued that tying doctrine’s quasi-per se rule is misguided because tying cannot create anticompetitive effects without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210407