Similar Search Results

Lehavi, Amnon - 2017

innovative theory of zoning and market externalities. It argues that zoning power should extend to regulate market externalities … control the various market externalities embedded in land use regulation, from effects on commercial activity to housing … the same time, such considerations of market externalities remain in the shadows of explicit zoning law and policy, as the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970271

Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512

I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553

Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777

On the co-evolution of investment and bargaining norms

Bagnoli, Lidia; Negroni, Giorgio - 2010 - This version: June 2010

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737849

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571

Renegotiation Facilitates Contractual Incompleteness

Wernerfelt, Birger - 2006

Attempts to economize on bargaining costs imply that two parties may write a contract which is incomplete in the sense that each party tacitly cedes some decision rights to the other. If decision-makers can be disciplined by the threat of ex post renegotiation of decisions initially delegated to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026493

Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities

Okada, Akira - In: Economic theory 75 (2023) 2, pp. 427-452

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226648

Externalities and the allocation of decision rights in the theory of the firm

Bester, Helmut - 2004 - Version 1.3, April 2004

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision maker's objective. The optimal assignment of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366572

Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights

Bester, Helmut - 2005

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371079