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A New Outside Option Value for Networks : The Kappa-Value – Measuring Distribution of Power of Political Agreements

Belau, Julia - 2012

the coalitional rents of the agents arising from the coalition formation? Once we have formalized the situation via a TU … yet, we find that the graph-X-value does not differ for networks referring to the same coalition while the Position value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170734

Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure

van den Brink, René - 2011

this game the dividend of any coalition that is neither a subset of a union nor a union of unions is zero. The partition … dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the graph is zero. We apply the values to an economic example in which the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118315

Minimal Exact Balancedness

Lohmann, Edwin - 2011

To verify whether a transferable utility game is exact, one has to check a linear inequality for each exact balanced collection of coalitions. This paper studies the structure and properties of the class of exact balanced collections. Comparing the definition of exact balanced collections with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130233

Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets

Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth - 2009

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159464

Public Good Coalitions and Membership Exclusion

Kung, Fan-chin - 2013

Many local public goods are provided in coalitions. When coalitions form they may have the power to exclude members. The core applies to such cases. When coalitions cannot exclude members, all who prefer the provided public good can join. The no-exodus equilibrium is proposed for such cases. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082355

Power Indices Expressed in Terms of Minimal Winning Coalitions

Lange, Fabien - 2012

A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105832

Proximity and Linkages among Coalition Participants : A New Voting Power Measure Applied to the International Monetary Fund

Reynaud, Julien P. M. - 2007

Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. Using … cooperative game theory, Banzhaf (1965) developed an index to capture the numerical importance of voters in coalition building … also developed to account for the relative importance of coalitions and the relative linkages among coalition participants …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775986

Cores of Combined Games

Bloch, Francis - 2009

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718527

Domains of Social Choice Functions on Which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent

Takamiya, Koji - 2006

It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if … results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733205

Stability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition

Brangewitz, Sonja; Brockhoff, Sarah - 2012

particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions … means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the … coalitional equilibrium. For a given form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506562