, together with the means by which collaborative benefits should be allocated, which coalition should form? We propose a new … methodology based on what we call leading coalitions to address this coalition selection problem, which borrows concepts from …

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they 'fall back' on … their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If … there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition …

distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation are characterized in four illustrative applications. …

polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive to join a coalition whose members mutually truthfully exchange …

show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition …

value of a coalition-based on the best or worst roommate in the coalition. In all cases, we determine the complexity of …

of countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset … of the parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The … small stable coalition is not very effec- tive in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The …